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1 Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to study the demand of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures for external equity, 
revealing the conditions that determine whether, when and where they decide to seek external equity during their 
lives, and why some of them do not seek at all. 
Companies’ preferences for the different forms of finance (namely equity and debt) have always attracted substantial 
interest from both policy makers and academics. Since 2008, the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank have administered the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) to thousands of SMEs in the 
euro area. The results of the SAFE constantly reveal that bank financing is the most relevant source of external 
financing for small and medium companies. In 2017, 52% of respondent SMEs declared to use bank loans to finance 
their businesses, while only 12% considered external equity to be a relevant source of funding (ECB 2017). 
Similarly, according to Robb and Robinson (2014), only around 5% of new US-based firms receive external equity 
in the first 4 years of operations and most of them primarily and heavily rely on external debt, often guaranteed by 
the entrepreneur. These results seems to be consistent with the pecking order theory, according to which companies 
prefer external debt to external equity, because of the lower cost of capital (Myers and Majluf 1984).  
However, debt financing is not suitable for high-tech entrepreneurial ventures. While these companies are an 
important source of economic growth and innovation (Acs et al. 2011), unfortunately they are also the ones that face 
the strongest difficulties in collecting the outside capital they need to develop their businesses. Due to information 
asymmetries, lenders encounter severe difficulties in the ex-ante evaluation of the potential of the entrepreneurial 
project and in the ex-post monitoring of the decisions made by entrepreneurs (Carpenter and Petersen 2002). The 
highly technical investment projects, the lack of track record and low value of tangible assets to be pledged as 
collateral further discourage banks to lend money to high-tech ventures (Berger and Udell 1990).  
Equity capital is considered more suitable for high-tech entrepreneurial ventures because it does not require 
collateral, it does not accentuate moral hazard problems that are associated with leverage and it does not increase the 
likelihood of financial distress and failure (Carpenter and Petersen 2002). This is possible because equity investors, 
especially the most formal ones like venture capitalists, address information asymmetries more effectively than 
traditional financial intermediaries, thanks to their superior screening capabilities and the use of monitoring and 
staging mechanisms (Kaplan and Strömberg 2001). Moreover, equity capital entails minimal cash flow drains in the 
short term, which are typically associated with debt financing (Ou and Haynes 2006). 
Despite its relevance, the demand for external equity of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures is largely understudied. 
While there are a number of papers that study the demand for external financing in general, very few focus on 
external equity and entrepreneurial ventures, let alone high-tech ones. Cosh et al. (2009) examine a sample of 
entrepreneurial firms based in the United Kingdom, and study what determines the choice whether to apply for 
external equity rather than debt. They find that young, high-growth innovative companies without significant assets 
or profits seek capital from venture capital funds more than other ventures. Riding et al. (2012) focus on young 
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Canadian firms, and find that those investing in R&D are more likely to prefer equity over debt than the others. In an 
Italian sample of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures, Bertoni et al. (2018a) consider how the local supply of venture 
capital affects the demand for external equity. Their results show that when the local venture capital market is thin, 
only a small fraction of firms are willing to incur in entry cost to be in the venture capital (VC) market. To the best 
of our knowledge, only Colombo et al. (2018) use an international setting to study the demand for external equity of 
high-tech entrepreneurial ventures. They reveal that entrepreneurial ventures’ demand is influenced by the local 
availability of venture capital, but not by the characteristics of VC markets located far away and beyond national 
borders.  
In this paper we contribute to this limited literature on the demand for external equity by high-tech entrepreneurial 
ventures. Specifically, we make four contributions. First, our analysis is based on an international dataset, which 
allows us to consider how the institutional framework in which the companies are embedded influences their 
demand for external equity. Second, we consider a wide set of determinants of the decision to seek external equity, 
at the company-, industry- and country-levels, taking inspiration from different streams of the entrepreneurial 
finance literature. Third, while existing evidence is limited to the determinants of companies’ decision about 
whether to look for external equity, we also consider the decisions about when and where to look. Specifically, we 
exploit information about the age class during which companies looked for external equity for the first time, and 
whether they looked only in the domestic markets or also in the international one. Fourth, we document the most 
common reasons that prevent high-tech entrepreneurial ventures from seeking equity capital and link such reasons 
with company-, country- and industry-specific characteristics. By doing so, we aim at providing a more complete 
picture of the demand side of the equity financing.  
Our empirical investigation is based on a sample of 530 high tech entrepreneurial ventures extracted from the VICO 
database. The database has been created as a part of a research project promoted by the European Commission. Our 
sample companies are located in 7 European countries and founded between 1984 and 2004. They answered to a 
survey administered in 2010 regarding their external equity seeking behavior, the timing, the geographical scope of 
their search and the reasons behind the decision not to seek. 
In our sample, 47.55% of respondents looked for external equity during their lives. The first interesting result 
regards the reasons why some high-tech entrepreneurial ventures do not seek external equity: in most cases, they 
simply think that external equity is not needed. We then reveal that the strongest determinants of the decision to seek 
external equity are company-specific characteristics, namely the human capital of the founding team, the 
innovativeness of a company, the size, the intangibility of assets and the availability of cash flows. We also find that 
these factors have a different role in explaining whether, when and where a company will seek external equity. On 
the contrary, industry-specific and country-specific characteristics play a secondary role in determining the decision 
to seek external equity. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review the existing literature we are trying to contribute. In section 
3, we describe the data and methodology used in our econometric analysis. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 
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concludes the paper summarizing our main findings and discussing the contribution to the literature, the limitations 
and the policy implications of this study. 
2 Literature review 
Although literature is rich in contributions looking at equity investors and at the factors driving their decision to 
provide equity capital (for what concerns VC see e.g., Baum and Silverman, 2004; Hall and Hofer, 1993; Petty and 
Gruber, 2011; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001), the 
demand-side of equity financing has received limited attention. In fact, only few studies have considered the 
determinants of the decision of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures to look for external equity. 
As previously mentioned, Cosh et al. (2009), Riding et al. (2012), Bertoni et al. (2018a) and Colombo et al. (2018) 
are, to the best of our knowledge, the only studies that have specifically addressed this issue. Some other studies did 
not focus explicitly on equity but addressed the more general question of what drives companies’ demand for 
external capital, which of course includes external debt (e.g., Eckhardt et al. 2006; Mina et al. 2013). 
The human capital of the founding team seems to be a key driver of companies’ decision to seek external finance 
(and equity in particular) (Bertoni, et al. 2018a; Colombo et al. 2018; Cosh et al. 2009). On the one hand, more 
educated and experienced founders may be better informed about the benefits (and costs) associated with external 
equity, and therefore more likely to apply for it. On the other hand, literature showed that companies whose founders 
have higher human capital, are more likely to grow and prosper (Cooper et al. 1994). Human capital may therefore 
be linked with the growth orientation of the company, which also has been found to positively affect external 
financing seeking behaviour (Cosh et al. 2009; Eckhardt et al. 2006; Mina et al. 2013; Riding et al. 2012). Moreover, 
Cosh et al. (2009) argue that professional leadership provides ventures with the governance required to mitigate 
information asymmetries and agency costs associated with financing early stage high-tech companies, and therefore 
increases companies’ likelihood to seek external equity.  
Literature also highlights a stronger need for external equity for smaller and more innovative companies. Such 
companies face stronger difficulties in collecting traditional forms of finance (such as credit). Smaller companies 
lack collateral (Berger and Udell 1990), while more innovative companies are characterized by risky projects and 
highly opaque growth prospects (Carpenter and Petersen 2002). As debt is not an option, smaller and more 
innovative ventures may be more prone to look for external equity. Ou and Haynes (2006) and Colombo et al. 
(2018) show results that support this claim for size and innovation, respectively.  
Another company-level characteristic that has been considered by the literature on the demand for external equity is 
the availability of alternative sources of finance, namely cash flows and debt. According to the pecking order theory, 
companies should turn to equity only if internally generated funds and debt are not an option (Myers 1984). The 
results by Mina et al. (2013) and Colombo et al. (2018) confirm this view.  
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Some works on the demand for external capital also considered the role of industry-level characteristics. Eckhardt et 
al. (2006) and Cosh et al. (2009) find that the level of competition in the sector in which companies operate 
positively predicts companies’ propensity to look for external finance.  
Lastly, the characteristics of the geographical area in which the ventures are embedded are key drivers of their 
demand for external equity in the works of Bertoni et al. (2018a) and Colombo et al. (2018). These studies focus on 
the supply of venture capital investments, finding that bigger venture capital markets lead to a higher propensity to 
look for external equity, but only when they are located nearby and within national borders. 
Summing up, extant literature suggests several factors that may determine whether high-tech entrepreneurial 
ventures may be seeking equity capital during their lives: 1) characteristics of the companies, such as the human 
capital of the founding team, the innovativeness of the venture, the size, and the availability of alternative sources of 
finance, namely cash flows and debt; 2) characteristics of the industry of operations, namely the competition; and 3) 
characteristics of the geographical area, such as the local supply of external equity.  
Additionally, in this paper we also uncover the determinants of the decisions regarding when and where some high-
tech entrepreneurial ventures look for external equity and why some others do not look for external equity at all.  
When to seek external equity. Ventures may apply for external equity at different stages of their development. 
Extant literature studied the impact of companies’ age on their propensity to look for external financing, finding 
mixed results. Ou and Haynes (2006) and Mina et al. (2013) find that younger companies are more likely to look for 
external finance than older ones, coherently with the fact that companies’ financing needs are highest during the 
“valley of death” phase that characterizes the very first years after foundation. On the contrary, Eckhardt et al. 
(2006) and Colombo et al. (2018) find a positive relationship between age and propensity to seek in their sample of 
young ventures. These seemly contradictory results may be explained by the presence of some (neglected) factors 
that influence the age at which ventures look for external finance for the first time. For instance, companies with 
higher human capital may be more grow oriented and may look for external equity earlier. Additionally, ventures 
operating in more R&D oriented industry may have anticipated needs for finance, to cover the high cash outflow 
associated with the long development process of R&D investments. On the contrary, the presence of early positive 
cash flows may reduce the propensity to seek external equity at a young age. Additionally, companies may refrain 
from looking for equity at a very young age when they face the risk that their technology can be misappropriated by 
external investors, especially by those with strategic objectives like corporate venture capitalists (Colombo and Shafi 
2016; Katila et al. 2008). Therefore, one may expect that companies that are able to protect their technology more 
effectively, thanks to stronger IPR protection mechanisms, may be looking for external equity earlier than others.  
Where to seek external equity. Some entrepreneurial ventures may be even willing to actively look for external 
equity on foreign markets, besides domestic ones. Although cross-border equity investments have been largely 
studied in the existing literature (e.g., see Devigne et al. 2016; Meuleman et al. 2017 for recent examples), the 
decision of entrepreneurial ventures to look abroad for external equity has received little academic attention. 
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Presumably, such decision is likely to bear relevant costs for a nascent venture.
1
 First, when looking for investors in 
foreign countries, entrepreneurs cannot rely on their local social relationships, which are essential for new ventures 
in attracting financial resources (Shane and Cable 2002; Stuart and Sorensen 2003). Second, differences in 
regulations and tax policies greatly increase the complexity of cross-border investments (Cumming and Macintosh 
2003; Wright et al. 2005). Third, institutional and cultural differences between entrepreneurs and foreign investors 
exacerbate information asymmetries further increasing search costs and reduce the likelihood that the search will be 
successful (Li and Zahra 2012). In line with these arguments, Colombo et al. (2018) show that high-tech 
entrepreneurial ventures demand for external capital is hardly affected by the availability of VC beyond national 
borders. Nevertheless, we expect that some companies will be more likely to look for equity capital abroad than 
others. First, companies may be looking abroad when the conditions in the local markets are inadequate, for instance 
in terms of supply of capital (Tykvová and Schertler 2011), exit opportunities for investors (Bertoni and Groh 2014), 
or, more in general, tax and legal environment. In other words, though costly, seeking equity abroad may be 
necessary for promising ventures affected by unfavourable country conditions. Second, foreign investors may also 
entail benefits in terms of access to specific resources, which may be more valuable to some companies. For 
instance, Mäkelä and Maula (2005) document that foreign VC investors can help entrepreneurial ventures to expand 
their business into the country of the investor. Therefore, we expect the grow orientation of a company (captured for 
example by the quality of human capital) to push entrepreneurial ventures in this direction.  
Why not to seek external equity. As to our knowledge, no previous studies have empirically studied the reasons 
behind the decision of entrepreneurial ventures to abstain from looking for external equity. Few studies however 
suggests some possible reasons. Bertoni et al.’s (2016) theoretical model implies that even good performing ventures 
may refrain from looking because of too high search and opportunity costs, especially in less developed market. Mason 
and Harrison (2001) report anecdotal evidence about the unwillingness to share ownership and control with external 
investors being a significant determinant of SMEs’ equity aversion. Supporting this claim, Brav (2009) shows that 
UK private firms with less dispersed ownership, i.e., those with a stronger desire to retain control, are less likely to 
rely on external equity financing and have higher debt ratios. Another aspect highlighted by Mason and Harrison 
(2001) is the investment readiness: investor may chose not to invest “because of shortcoming of the entrepreneur and 
shortcomings of the business”, like for example poor management team and limited growth prospects. Anticipating 
these shortcomings, resulting into a low probability to have access to external equity capital, entrepreneurs may refrain 
from looking for external equity at all. Similarly, external equity investors may require a very high risk premiums to 
start-ups companies, especially those characterized by high levels of information opacity. This translates into a low 
pre-money valuation of the venture and can represent an additional discoursing factor for looking for external equity. 
                                                 
1
 It is worth emphasizing that this issue has also relevant policy implication, especially in Europe. The European 
Commission has taken several steps to overcome the national barriers to cross-border investment flows, most 
notably through the introduction of the VC passport (European Commission 2007).  
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Company-, industry-, and country-specific characteristics may have a role in explaining why some entrepreneurial 
ventures did not look for external equity during their lives. For instance, companies whose growth prospects are less 
ambitious, or that have more financial resources available, will arguably not look for external equity because additional 
financial resources may be superfluous. Companies with less tangible proof of their potential may instead refrain from 
looking for external equity because of the low probability to obtain a good offer. 
3 Data and Method 
3.1 Sample 
We test our predictions on a cross-section sample composed of 530 European high-tech entrepreneurial ventures 
extracted from the VICO database. The VICO database was built thanks to the joint effort of nine universities across 
Europe with the support of the Seventh European Framework. Companies in the VICO database operate in seven 
European countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. They were founded 
between 1984 and 2004, were independent at foundation (i.e., not controlled by other business organizations), and 
operate in the following high-tech manufacturing and service industries: nanotechnology; biotechnology; 
pharmaceuticals; computers; electronic components; telecommunications equipment; precision, optical and medical 
instruments; robotics; aerospace; software; telecommunications services; internet and multimedia services; web 
publishing; renewable energies; R&D and engineering services. The VICO database includes two strata of ventures: 
759 VC-backed ventures, extracted randomly from several databases of VC investments, and a control group of 
7,611 non-VC-backed ventures that are potential targets of VC investments and have the same distribution across 
country, age, independence, industry, and legal status of the VC-backed companies (for more information on how 
the VICO database was built, see Bertoni and Martí, 2011). 
In February 2010, a survey was sent to VICO companies in order to collect information about whether, when and 
where they sought external equity during their lives. The survey was sent to 5,417 ventures for which an email 
address was available. After four reminders, sent between February and April 2010, and several phone interviews 
aimed at filling in missing data and checking the reliability of the information provided, 814 companies eventually 
answered to the survey (response rate of 15.03%).
2
  
In this paper, we use the data on 530 ventures for which we have complete information on the variables of interest. 
As the unit of analysis is the high-tech entrepreneurial venture, our final dataset includes 530 observations. Table 1 
shows the distribution of sample companies by country, industry and foundation periods.  
                                                 
2 The distribution of survey respondents with respect to survey recipients is similar across foundation periods 
(2(4)=4.061) but significantly different across countries (2(6)=252.04) and industries (2(6)=14.052). These 
differences may result in a response bias, which we take in consideration in the robustness check section of the 
paper.   
9 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
3.2 Variables and statistics 
We use four dependent variables, each corresponding to one of our research questions.  
To answer to the question regarding whether entrepreneurial ventures sought equity financing, we use as dependent 
variable the dummy Seeking, which takes a value of 1 for companies that sought equity financing at some point in 
their lives and 0 otherwise. To build this variable, we used the answers that our 530 sample companies gave to the 
following survey question: “Has your company ever sought equity financing from sources other than founders, their 
family members and friends?”. Of the 530 sample high-tech entrepreneurial ventures, 252 (47.55%) had actively 
sought equity financing at some point in their lives.  
To companies that answered “Yes” to the question regarding whether they ever looked for external equity, the 
survey also asked when and where they actually sought financing. To indicate when they sought external finance, 
respondents could select among the following nonexclusive alternatives: “before or at the time of foundation; in the 
first 2 years after foundation; between the 2nd and 5th years after foundation; between the 5th and 10th years after 
foundation; after the 10th year after foundation”. 3 The answers to such question were used to build the second 
dependent variable of this study, i.e., the categorical variable AgeAtSeeking.  This variable is defined only if Seeking 
is equal to 1 and can take 5 possible values, corresponding to the earliest period during which companies sought 
external equity. In other terms, AgeAtSeeking indicates when the sample companies sought equity financing for the 
first time. Out of the 252 sample companies that sought external financing during their lives, 249 specified when. 
Figure 1 shows that most of sample companies looked for external equity early in their lives: 35.54% of them at 
foundation, 25.70% in the first 2 years after foundation, 19.68% between the 2nd and the 5th year after foundation, 
12.45% between the 5th and the 10th year after foundation and the remainder 7.63% after the 10th year after 
foundation.  
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
As to the where companies sought equity financing, we have information on whether companies sought equity 
financing on the international markets, rather than only in the domestic one. Specifically, we use as third dependent 
variable the dummy SeekingAbroad, equal to 1 if respondents answered Yes to the question “please indicate whether 
your company ever sought equity financing outside national borders”, and 0 otherwise. Out of the 252 sample 
companies that sought external financing during their lives, 217 answered to this question. 88 of them (40.55%) 
declared that they sought equity financing abroad.  
                                                 
3 To reduce retrospective bias and to increase response rates, we decided not to inquire about ventures' seeking 
behavior on a year-by-year basis. Instead, we collected information on ventures’ external equity-seeking behavior in 
5 periods of their early life, which was relatively easy for respondent to identify and remember.  
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Our last dependent variable regards why not looking for external equity. Companies that answerer “No” to the 
question regarding whether they looked for external equity, were asked for the most important motivation for such 
decision. Respondents could select among the following alternatives: “other sources of financing (including cash 
flows from operations) have always been sufficient; obtaining equity financing was unlikely; receiving a good offer 
was unlikely; external shareholders would have too much control; and other”. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 
174 answers we collected for this question. Some 60.35% of respondents did not seek external equity because it was 
not needed: other sources of financing, including internally generated cash flows, were sufficient to finance their 
operations. An additional 14.94% were instead reluctant to seek external equity because of the loss of control due to 
the presence of external shareholders. 12.64% did not look for equity financing because they believed they would 
not receive good offers, and an additional 9.77% simply thought they would never receive an offer at all. We used 
the answers to this question to generate a categorical variable called WhyNotSeeking that takes different values 
depending on the selected answer. In order to increase the numerosity in each category, we aggregated the latter two 
reasons in a category that considers cases in which companies did not look for external equity because it was 
unlikely to receive a good offer, or to receive an offer at all.  
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
We use several independent variables to study the determinants of entrepreneurial ventures’ decisions regarding 
whether, when, where and why not to seek external equity. To cope with endogeneity issues and reverse causality, 
all independent variables are measured at the foundation. 
First, to measure the human capital of founders, we use once again the results of the survey. Specifically, the survey 
asked sample companies whether “among the founders of the company there were individuals who, before the 
foundation of the company: i) had previous managerial experience, ii) had founded one or more firms, iii) had 
obtained an MBA or a master degree in Economics and iv) had obtained a PhD in technical or scientific 
disciplines”. We coded the answers to these questions with 4 dummy variables, Manager, Serial, MBA and 
PhD_science, respectively. Unfortunately, the information on the human capital is missing for 103 companies in our 
sample (19.43%). In order not to lose such observations, we impute values of human capital equal to 0 for all the 
variables mentioned above if the information is missing. We also include a dummy HCmissing equal to 1 if the 
human capital information is missing and 0 otherwise. This approach allows us to keep the 103 observations in the 
sample, and to correct for the change in slope in human capital variables that the arbitrary imputation of the 0 would 
otherwise generate (for a similar approach, see Dale and Krueger, 2002). 
Second, we proxy the innovativeness of sample companies with the variable PatentApplications, equal to the 
number of patent applications companies had in the first year of their lives. The variable is present in the VICO 
database and was originally retrieved from PATSTAT. 
Third, we use accounting variables, which we measure in the first year of companies’ lives.  lnTotalAssets is equal 
to the logarithm of total assets (+1) and captures the size at foundation of entrepreneurial ventures. Intangibles is 
11 
 
equal to the ratio of intangible assets on total assets, and measures the asset intangibility of sample companies. This 
variable is relevant as intangible assets cannot be used as collateral and therefore limit companies’ ability to rely on 
debt. NCFonAssets is the ratio of net cash flow generated divided by the asset of sample companies, and proxies for 
the internal cash generated by operations. Leverage is the ratio of financial debt (short term and long term) on total 
assets, and captures companies’ ability to access debt. Complete accounting information is available for only 253 
(47.74%) of our sample companies. Therefore, similarly to what we do for the human capital variables, we impute 
the missing values of accounting variables to 0, and control for the variable AccountingMissing in the estimates to 
correct for the possible bias of this data manipulation. This variable is a dummy equal to 1 if missing were imputed 
to 0, and 0 otherwise.
4
 
Fourth, we include in our models some variables measured at the industry level. Competition is the market 
Herfindahl concentration index in the sector of operation of sample companies (NAICS classification, 4 digits, 
source: Annual Survey of Manufactures and Compustat Business Segment data). We also include PatentsProtection, 
which measures the effectiveness of patents in protecting innovation in the investee company’s sector of operations 
(SIC classification, 3-digit). The measure was collected by Cambridge University in a survey administered in 2004 
to U.S. and U.K. manufacturing and business services firms with less than 250 employees (Cosh et al. 2011). From 
the same survey, we also retrieve information about the percentage of employees with scientific education in the 
industry, ScienceWorkforce, our proxy for the R&D intensity of the sector. 
Fifth, we consider three country-level characteristics, measured in the year of company foundation. NoIPOonGDP is 
the number of IPOs registered in the country of the company in the foundation year (source: Thomson One) divided 
by the GDP of the country (source: World Bank). The variable represents the availability of exit routes for equity 
investors. LegalIndex is a time invariant index developed by EVCA (now Invest Europe) in 2008 and measures to 
what extent the tax and legal environment in each European country favors the development of private equity, venture 
capital and entrepreneurship (EVCA 2008). In order to capture investor’s protection in a country, we rely on the 
variable ShareholderRights. The variable is the “Ease of shareholder suits index” measured by World Bank in the 
doing business database and it is country specific. Lastly, VCfundraisingonGDP represents the supply of equity 
capital, and captures the annual amount raised by venture capitalists (source: Thomson One) divided by national GDP. 
The variable is measured in the foundation year. 
Lastly, we include foundation period fixed effects by means of a set of dummies. When possible, we also consider 
country and industry fixed effects. In Table 2, we provide summary statistics for the independent variables, while 
the correlation matrix is shown in Table 3.  
                                                 
4
 Despite the smaller sample, results are similar when we do not impute missing values in human capital and 
accounting variables to 0, and are available from the authors upon request. 
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[Insert Table 2 and Table 3 around here] 
4 Results 
The nature of our dependent variables determines the specific econometric model chosen for the analysis. When 
using as dependent variables the dummy variables Seeking and SeekingAbroad, we rely on probit models. For the 
categorical ordinal variable AgeAtSeeking, we use instead an ordered probit model. For the categorical variable 
WhyNotSeeking, we use a multinomial logit. Each dependent variable is regressed against variables capturing 
companies’ human capital, innovativeness, accounting information, characteristics of the industry and characteristics 
of the countries in which the companies operate. Foundation period dummies are included in all models.   
Column I of Table 4 shows the results of the analysis of the determinants of the decision to seek external finance by 
sample companies (the dependent variable is Seeking). All our human capital variables, with the exception of Serial, 
have positive and significant coefficients. The average marginal effects indicate that companies whose founders had 
previous managerial experience, an MBA or a PhD in science are respectively 12.95%, 10.73% and 13.63% more 
likely to look for external equity (significant at the 1%, 10% and 5% level). The innovativeness of companies, 
captured by the number of patents applications, and the cash flows generation ability do not play a significant role, 
while bigger companies, with more intangibles and lower cash flows are more likely to look for external equity. A 
1% increase in lnTotalAssets and Intangibles lead to an increase in the probability to seek of 2.66% and 47.66% 
percent, respectively (significant at the 5% and 1% level). We do not find any significant coefficient for our 
industry-specific characteristics, while at country-level, the level of shareholder rights is positive and significant. A 
1% increase in the variable ShareholderRights leads to a 4.52% increase in the likelihood to seek external equity 
(significant at the 1% level). 
In Column II of Table 4 we show the results of a similar analysis in which we use AgeAtSeeking as dependent 
variable, and we restrict the sample to companies that sought external equity. In other words, we look at the timing 
of seeking, given that a company has actually looked for equity. In this case, we rely on an ordered probit model. 
For companies that sought external equity, the human capital of the founders had a limited influence on the timing 
of the seeking. The only significant effect is for PhD_science, which has a negative and significant coefficient, 
suggesting that companies with very highly educated founding team tend to look for external equity earlier in their 
lives. Average marginal effects indicate that the presence of a PhD in the founding team increases the probability to 
seek at foundation by 13.23%, and reduce the probability to seek after the 5th year after foundation by about 4% 
(depending on the category). These effects are significant at the 5% level at least. Results show a strongly negative 
effect of PatentApplications, which indicates that more innovative companies seek external financing when they are 
younger. A 1% increase in the number of patents translates in a probability to seek equity at foundation 6.42% 
higher and to seek in later age classes about 2% lower (5% significance level). We find a similar effect for 
companies’ size, as suggested by the negative and significant coefficient of lnTotalAssets: 1% bigger companies are 
2.24% more likely to seek at foundation and about 0.7% less likely to seek between the 3rd and the 10th year after 
foundation (10% significance level). With respect to industry-level variables, we find that in sectors with larger 
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science workforce, companies look for equity when they are relatively younger: a 1% increase in ScienceWorkforce 
leads to an increase by 0.05% in the probability to seek at foundation and a reduction by 0.02% to seek after the 3rd 
year after foundation (10% significance level). Country-level variables are not significant. 
Column III of Table 4 reports the analysis of SeekingAbroad, conducted using probit models on the sample of 
companies that sought equity. Companies with a PhD in their founding team are 20.18% more likely to look abroad 
(significant at the 1% level), while other human capital variables are not significant. Innovation also exert a positive 
effect on the probability to seek equity abroad: a 1% increase in patent applications increases the chances to look 
abroad by 10.26% (5% significance), while a similar increase in net cash flow over total assets reduces the chances 
by 11.78% (significant at the 5% level). Industry-level characteristics are not important drivers of companies’ 
decision to look for external equity abroad, while country-level variables play a significant role. The probability to 
seek abroad decreases by 23.98% and increase by 5.97% respectively when the legal index and the shareholder 
rights index increase by 1% (5% significance for both effects). 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
Lastly, we focus on companies in our sample that did not seek external equity and study the determinants of the 
reasons for not seeking with a multinomial logit. As the dependent variable WhyNotSeeking has three categories, we 
use the reason “other sources of financing (including cash flows from operations) have always been sufficient” as 
reference category. Table 5 shows the determinants of the other two reasons with respect to the reference category. 
Specifically, we consider as alternative motivation “obtaining equity financing or receiving a good offer was 
unlikely” in Column a and “external shareholders would have too much control” in column b. Interestingly, not 
seeking companies with more patents are less concerned about the low chances of obtaining a (good) offer (effect 
significant at the 1% level), but rather abstain because shareholders do not want to lose control of the company (at 
the 5% level). Not surprisingly, for companies that have high net cash flow the most common reason for not seeking 
is the fact that external equity is not needed (the reference category), while the other two motivations are less likely 
(at the 5% level). Companies with more leverage are more concerned about the low chances to obtain a (good) offer 
(at the 5% level) while the competition in the industry and the availability of exit opportunities for VC investors in 
the country increase the chances of not seeking because of the fear of loss of control (effects significant at the 1% 
and 5% levels respectively).   
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
4.1 Robustness checks 
We tested the robustness of our results in different ways. First, we considered alternative measures for some of our 
country- and industry-specific independent variables. As proxy of the innovation intensity in the sector, we 
substituted the variable ScienceWorkforce with a variable measuring the funds for industrial R&D as a percentage of 
sales in each sector. The variable refers to the top 4 industrial R&D-performing companies in the United States 
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(source: NSF industrial R&D data, 2007 version). For the strength of IPR protection, we substituted 
PatentsProtection with a variable that also takes into account other formal measures of IPR protection, such as the 
registration of design, trademarks, confidentiality agreements and copyright. We retrieved information on the 
effectiveness of such measures in protection innovation from Cambridge University’s (Cosh et al. 2011) and 
averaged the scores registered by all of these measures. For the ease of doing business in the country, we substituted 
ShareholderRights with the “Time to start a business”, information that comes from the same survey carried out by 
World Bank (doing business database). For the VC availability, we considered only GVC fundraising instead of the 
fundraising from any VC investor type (VCfundraisingonGDP). The rationale is that GVC programs are specifically 
targeted to young and innovative companies (Bertoni et al. 2015), and may therefore influence the demand for 
external equity of such companies more effectively than private investors. Results based on all these alternative 
measures are very similar to the ones shown in the main analysis. 
Second, we tested whether our results are affected by a response bias. As previously mentioned, the distribution of 
the respondents to our survey is different from the distribution of recipients along the country and industry 
dimensions. In order to correct for the potential bias that may emerge from these differences, we rely on a Heckman 
approach. We first estimated a probit model on the 5,417 survey recipients, in which the dependent variable is equal 
to 1 for the 814 respondents. We used as independent variables the age of the company in 2010, the industry and 
country dummies. We then used the results of the probit model to generate an Inverse Mills Ratio that corrects for 
the response bias (if any) in our main analyses. Additionally, we controlled for late response bias by including in the 
estimates a variable indicating the month during which the respondent answered to the survey (ranging from 
February to August). Results are unaffected by the inclusion of such correction terms.  
Third, we acknowledge that in our sample countries characterized by more developed equity financial markets, such 
as the United Kingdom, are to some extent underrepresented. Therefore, we checked to what extent our results are 
driven by less important equity markets. In order to do so, we repeated the analysis on the sample of companies 
operating in countries in which the VC markets are most developed. We use OECD data on the VC investments in 
seed, start-up and early stages as a percentage of GDP in 2015 (OECD 2016) as proxy for VC development, and we 
identified Finland, France, Germany and UK as the most developed VC markets (early-stage VC investments 
ranging from 1.4% and 3.6% of GDP, as opposed to Belgium, Spain and Italy where VC investments ranging from 
0.1% and 0.9% of GDP). Results indicate that the sign of the effects is maintained in the subsample of companies 
located in Finland, France, Germany and UK, although the coefficients are less significant, probably as a 
consequence of the smaller sample size.   
Overall, results of our robustness checks are in line with those of the main analysis, and are omitted here for the sake 
of synthesis. However, they are available from the authors upon request. 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
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In this paper we analyse what drives entrepreneurial ventures’ choice to seek external equity financing. In particular, 
we study whether, when (i.e., at what age) and where (i.e., international or domestic market) a company looks for 
external equity. In addition, we provide evidence on the most important reasons for not looking for external equity at 
all. Our analysis is based on a sample of 530 high-tech entrepreneurial ventures extracted from the VICO database 
that answered to a survey about their external equity seeking behaviour. Sample companies were founded between 
1984 and 2004, operate in high-tech sectors and are located in seven European countries. 
Some 52.45% of our sample companies never looked for external equity financing. Many of these companies simply 
thought that external equity was not needed to fund operations. Instead, when additional external capital was needed, 
most discouraging factors for applying to external equity were the risk of losing control of the company and the 
perceived low chances to either access equity or obtaining it at convenient conditions. 
We then identify the company-specific characteristics that drive the decision to seek external equity. We find that a 
higher level of human capital of the founding team is positively associated to such decision, with an effect that is 
robust and strong in magnitude. This evidence is in line with the so-called capability effect of human capital 
(Colombo and Grilli 2005): highly skilled entrepreneurs are more likely to found ventures based on innovative and 
profitable business ideas, and these ideas will need more resources in comparison with less valuable ones. In other 
words, on average, a higher level of founders’ human capital is related with higher growth expectation, 
innovativeness and resource needs, especially in high-tech sectors (Colombo et al. 2004). Interestingly and 
consistently with Bertoni et al. (2018a), we find that economic education (i.e. an MBA) and managerial experience 
are associated with a higher probability of seeking external equity. However, we do not find an impact on the time at 
which a company seek, nor on the probability to look abroad. 
Another interesting piece of evidence regarding human capital is that founders with a PhD in science are more likely 
to look for external equity, to seek earlier in their lives and more internationally. Similarly, the innovativeness of a 
company, in terms of the number of patent application in the first year, leads seeking companies to look for equity 
earlier in their lives and outside of the national borders. These results highlight how science-based ventures are more 
likely to need external capital early in their life (arguably to cover the expenses of long and expenses R&D 
processes) and to incur in additional search costs that seeking abroad is likely to entail. The positive effect of patent 
applications also suggests that potential misappropriation of the technology may be a concern. Interestingly, we find 
that the shareholders of more innovative companies may not look for external equity for fear of losing control of the 
firm, while they are seldom affected by the concern of not receiving a good offer.  
In addition, we also document that bigger companies (in terms of total assets) are more likely to seek external 
equity, especially at foundation, but less likely to seek abroad. The intangibility of assets also positively drives the 
choice to seek equity, but have no influence on when and where to seek. Interestingly, we find that companies that 
are able to generate cash flows early in their lives, are less likely to look for equity abroad. Some of them do not 
look for external equity at all because they already have enough financial resources.   
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Industry-specific and country-specific characteristics also play a role in explaining when and where to seek external 
equity. Companies operating in science-oriented sectors seek equity earlier, possibly because they have to finance 
their R&D processes. Companies located in countries characterized by better tax and legal environments are less 
likely to seek external equity abroad. The shareholders of companies operating in more competitive sectors and in 
countries with more developed financial markets are more concerned about the loss of control of their business, 
leading to the decision not to seek external equity. 
These results contribute to the literature on the external finance-seeking behaviour of entrepreneurial ventures. 
Previous studies (Bertoni et al. 2018a; Colombo et al. 2018; Mina et al. 2013; Cosh et al. 2009; Eckhardt et al. 2006) 
considered some of the determinants that we have included in this work (e.g., cash generation, innovation, human 
capital). However, their analysis is limited to understand whether entrepreneurial ventures looked for external 
equity, while we also consider when and where some companies do, and why some others do not seek external 
equity. Additionally, unlike the majority of previous studies, we rely on an international database that encompasses 
several European countries and high-tech entrepreneurial ventures that were founded over a period of 20 years 
(1984-2004). This dataset gives us the unique opportunity to consider the financing decisions of companies that 
were founded in different periods and countries. Moreover, our results pertain to high-tech ventures, which arguably 
are the ones most affected by problems in accessing external equity (Carpenter and Petersen 2002). 
We also add to the general policy discourse about the reasons why sources of external equity financing in Europe are 
still underused with respect to other countries, such as the US (Bertoni et al. 2015; WSBI - ESBG 2015). Most of the 
policy interest has been targeted to fix market failures that concern the supply side of the market. For instance, 
governmental venture capital programs have been set up to provide equity financing to entrepreneurial ventures that 
are usually neglected by private investors despite their potential (e.g., Bertoni et al. 2018b; Guerini and Quas 2016).
5
 
However, we find that the demand side of the market is also influenced by market failures that may require 
governmental intervention. More than half among sample companies never sought external equity, claiming that this 
source of finance was not needed in 60% of the cases. One of the possible explanations for this trend is that 
entrepreneurs lack complete information about external equity funding sources (Ferrando et al. 2015). Our results 
seem to support this explanation, as we find that entrepreneurial teams with higher levels of economic education are 
more likely to seek. This information asymmetry may limit the demand for external funding and thereby the growth 
opportunities of firms, thus representing a market failure. It becomes then fundamental for policy makers to find 
ways to increase the awareness of entrepreneurs about the benefits associated with external equity financing, such as 
training programs that facilitate the development of financial capabilities and capacities (Mason and Harrison 2001). 
However, we also find that companies with a higher number of patents often do not look for external equity because 
                                                 
5
 On the other hand, hybrid quasi-equity forms of public intervention are also easing companies’ access to debt 
markets (see, e.g., Martí and Quas 2018).  
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of the fear of the loss of control, while companies with fewer patents are concerned regarding their chances to obtain 
a (good offer). These results add to the debate about whether the equity financial markets in Europe are less 
developed than in other developed areas because of the low quality of the demand. We find that even companies that 
are arguably of good quality (e.g., those that registered patents at foundation) can be reluctant to look for external 
equity for fear of losing control. The policy implication is that improvements in the protection of minority 
shareholders may help in alleviating concerns about the potential loss of control when external investors join the 
company. Our findings about the determinants of companies’ decision to look for external equity abroad are also 
particularly important for policy makers. We find that only companies with very high levels of scientific human 
capital (namely, a PhD) and owning patents are likely to face the high costs associated with a cross-border search of 
equity investors. This results highlight once again the fragmentation of the European equity (and specifically venture 
capital) industry, which has been a concern of European policy makers (European Commission 2007). 
As with any study, ours has some limitations that open up new directions for future research. The first limitation lies 
in the relatively small sample of the study, even if this is quite common in studies based on survey data. Although 
the response rate to our survey is in line with that of other similar studies (Mina et al. 2013), our final sample is 
limited by the availability of accounting data at foundation, despite our best efforts to collect such information. 
Second and relatedly, our study possibly oversamples companies located in less developed equity markets, such as 
Italy or Spain. Nevertheless, in a robustness check we showed that our results are similar when considering only the 
most developed countries in terms of equity market. Third, it is crucial in an analysis on the determinants of the 
demand for external equity to take into consideration the access to alternative sources of finance. In this sense, 
though we are able to control for the access to debt and the generation of internal capital, our dataset does not 
provide information about other sources like public grants. Fourth, we find limited evidence regarding the role of 
country-specific and industry-specific factors in affecting the demand for external equity. Part of this result may be 
due to the metrics used, that offer limited variation in time and across categories. In an unreported analysis, we find 
that some of our measures are more significant for companies born before the internet bubble (till 1999), while 
others are more significant after the bubble. Considering time-varying measures and extending the analysis to other 
countries, possibly including developing economies, would certainly bear additional interesting results. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: Distribution of seeking companies by age at first seeking 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of non-seeking companies by reason for not seeking 
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Table 1: Distribution of sample companies by country, industry and foundation period 
  No. %     No. % 
Distribution by country    Distribution by industry   
Belgium 52 9.81  Biotech, Pharmaceuticals and other R&D 108 20.38 
Finland 73 13.77  ICT manufacturing 108 20.38 
France 89 16.79  Internet & Multimedia 29 5.47 
Germany 28 5.28  Aerospace, automotive and robotics 35 6.60 
Italy 97 18.30  Software 231 43.58 
Spain 122 23.02  Telecommunications 19 3.58 
United Kingdom 69 13.02  Total 530 100.00 
Total 530 100.00     
       
Distribution by foundation period      
1984-1988 55 10.38     
1989-1992 60 11.32     
1993-1996 83 15.66     
1997-2000 175 33.02     
2001-2004 157 29.62     
Total 530 100.00     
              
Table 2: Summary statistics on independent variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
Manager 530 0.515 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Serial 530 0.343 0.475 0.000 1.000 
MBA 530 0.153 0.360 0.000 1.000 
PhD_science 530 0.221 0.415 0.000 1.000 
HCmissing 530 0.194 0.396 0.000 1.000 
PatentApplications 530 0.150 0.670 0.000 6.855 
lnTotalAssets  530 2.969 2.891 0.000 9.684 
Intangibles  530 0.058 0.145 0.000 0.919 
NCFonAssets  530 -0.058 0.483 -4.620 2.095 
Leverage 530 0.051 0.200 0.000 2.857 
AccountingMissing  530 0.523 0.500 0.000 1.000 
ScienceWorkforce 530 39.790 11.325 16.627 52.942 
PatentsProtection 530 0.742 0.164 0.538 1.212 
Competition 530 0.182 0.141 0.026 0.726 
NoIPOonGDP 530 0.059 0.074 0.000 0.345 
LegalIndex  530 1.628 0.297 1.230 2.180 
ShareholderRights 530 5.868 1.295 4.000 7.000 
VCfundraisingonGDP 530 0.828 1.664 0.000 8.030 
23 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix of independent variables 
The correlation matrix is based on 530 observations. 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Manager 1.00                 
2 Serial 0.48 1.00                
3 MBA 0.25 0.17 1.00               
4 PhD_science 0.07 0.07 0.24 1.00              
5 HCmissing -0.51 -0.36 -0.21 -0.26 1.00             
6 PatentApplications 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.19 -0.05 1.00            
7 lnTotalAssets  0.11 0.05 0.10 0.15 -0.07 0.16 1.00           
8 Intangibles  0.01 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.39 1.00          
9 NCFonAssets  -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 1.00         
10 Leverage 0.09 0.05 -0.03 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.20 0.10 -0.24 1.00        
11 AccountingMissing  -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.82 -0.38 0.09 -0.17 1.00       
12 ScienceWorkforce -0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.17 -0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.10 -0.04 0.01 -0.10 1.00      
13 PatentsProtection 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.16 0.00 0.14 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.53 1.00     
14 Competition 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.10 -0.02 -0.11 -0.35 -0.15 0.07 -0.09 0.31 0.38 -0.43 1.00    
15 NoIPOonGDP 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.16 -0.02 0.14 0.22 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.12 0.11 -0.02 -0.22 1.00   
16 LegalIndex  -0.26 -0.20 -0.11 -0.27 0.36 -0.13 -0.29 -0.11 -0.01 -0.05 0.14 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.01 1.00  
17 ShareholderRights -0.12 -0.13 -0.05 -0.04 0.24 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.06 0.20 0.21 0.28 1.00 
18 VCfundraisingonGDP 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.31 -0.08 0.21 0.23 0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.08 0.05 -0.17 0.59 -0.26 0.02 
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Table 4: Results on the analysis of whether, when and where to seek external equity financing 
The table shows coefficient and robust standard errors (in parenthesis) of regressions whose dependent variable and 
econometric specifications are specified in the first rows of the table. Foundation period dummies are included in all 
analysis but omitted for the sake of synthesis. Significance levels: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%.  
  I II III 
Dependent variable Seeking AgeAtSeeking SeekingAbroad 
Econometric model Probit Ordered Probit Probit 
       
Manager 0.400 *** -0.100  0.306  
 (0.148)  (0.179)  (0.267)  
Serial -0.025  0.129  0.209  
 (0.141)  (0.168)  (0.232)  
MBA 0.332 * -0.019  0.037  
 (0.179)  (0.175)  (0.217)  
PhD_science 0.421 ** -0.440 ** 0.671 *** 
 (0.169)  (0.173)  (0.235)  
HCmissing -0.774 *** 0.015  0.000  
 (0.199)  (0.313)  (0.000)  
PatentApplications 0.230  -0.213 ** 0.341 ** 
 (0.181)  (0.106)  (0.148)  
lnTotalAssets  0.082 ** -0.074 * -0.070  
 (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.059)  
Intangibles  1.473 *** -0.524  0.472  
 (0.461)  (0.552)  (0.600)  
NCFonAssets  -0.168  0.229  -0.391 ** 
 (0.138)  (0.168)  (0.175)  
Leverage -0.165  0.276  -0.704  
 (0.300)  (0.385)  (0.517)  
AccountingMissing  0.014  -0.356  0.232  
 (0.223)  (0.246)  (0.347)  
ScienceWorkforce -0.003  -0.018 * 0.014  
 (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.014)  
PatentsProtection -0.155  -0.695  0.080  
 (0.461)  (0.572)  (0.671)  
Competition 0.030  0.795  0.453  
 (0.729)  (0.924)  (1.367)  
NoIPOonGDP 0.122  -2.024  -0.376  
 (1.211)  (1.292)  (1.659)  
LegalIndex  0.251  -0.316  -0.797 ** 
 (0.241)  (0.305)  (0.372)  
ShareholderRights 0.140 *** 0.060  0.199 ** 
 (0.051)  (0.064)  (0.090)  
VCfundraisingonGDP 0.058  0.001  -0.042  
 (0.054)  (0.051)  (0.061)  
Constant                    -1.900 ***   -1.170  
  (0.724)     (1.202)   
       
N Obs. 530  249  217  
2                                            106.918 *** 103.556 *** 54.085 *** 
pseudo-R2                    0.179  0.117  0.211  
              
  
25 
 
Table 5: Results on the analysis of why not to seek external equity financing 
The table shows coefficient and robust standard errors (in parenthesis) of a multinomial logit regression whose 
dependent variable is WhyNotSeeking. The reason “other sources of financing (including cash flows from 
operations) have always been sufficient” is the reference category. “Obtaining equity financing or receiving a good 
offer was unlikely” is the alternative reason in column a and “external shareholders would have too much control” 
is he alternative reason in column b. Foundation period dummies are included in all analysis but omitted for the sake 
of synthesis. Significance levels: *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%.  
  I 
Categories a b 
     
Manager 0.251  -0.429  
 (0.517)  (0.716)  
Serial 0.459  -0.104  
 (0.471)  (0.703)  
MBA -1.327  0.340  
 (0.931)  (0.809)  
PhD_science 0.841  0.807  
 (0.677)  (0.604)  
HCmissing 0.212  -12.846 *** 
 (1.494)  (0.978)  
PatentApplications -11.538 *** 2.524 ** 
 (2.216)  (1.140)  
lnTotalAssets  0.119  0.297  
 (0.160)  (0.206)  
Intangibles  -0.458  -1.519  
 (3.091)  (2.966)  
NCFonAssets  -1.270 ** -1.305 ** 
 (0.578)  (0.594)  
Leverage 3.238 ** -1.444  
 (1.546)  (2.960)  
AccountingMissing  1.982 ** 1.904 * 
 (0.856)  (1.025)  
ScienceWorkforce -0.022  -0.025  
 (0.027)  (0.028)  
PatentsProtection -2.691  -1.192  
 (1.964)  (2.191)  
Competition 3.203  8.436 *** 
 (2.518)  (3.158)  
NoIPOonGDP 6.925  15.498 ** 
 (6.098)  (7.575)  
LegalIndex  0.279  -0.863  
 (0.887)  (1.017)  
ShareholderRights -0.056  -0.379  
 (0.216)  (0.265)  
VCfundraisingonGDP -0.106  -1.353  
 (0.193)  (0.845)  
Constant                    -0.414  1.688  
 (2.663)   (2.949)   
     
N Obs.  170   
Chi2                        1732.598 ***  
pseudo-R2                     0.203   
          
 
